-El tipo de cambio y los choques económicos asimétricos: Análisis de  Mundell.

El coste más importante de una unión monetaria- señalado por Mundell (1961) en su teoría de las  áreas monetarias óptimas -, es el que se deriva de la pérdida del tipo de cambio como instrumento de política macroeconómica. En efecto, el país que se integra en una unión monetaria total, pierde la posibilidad de realizar variaciones en el tipo de cambio de su moneda con respecto a la de los restantes miembros de la unión.  Sin embargo, la variación del tipo de cambio puede ser importante por dos motivos.

Primero, cuando es necesario alterar la relación real de intercambio, para hacer frente a ajustes en la economía frente a choques de oferta o demanda.

Segundo, cuando debido a la rigidez de salarios y precios domésticos, el camino de ajuste alternativo es un costoso proceso de recesión o inflación.
 

         Siguiendo a Mundell (1961), se puede abordar a nivel muy simple el problema del ajuste ante choques económicos, suponiendo un desplazamiento de demanda desde un miembro de la unión, que llamaremos España, hacia otro miembro, que llamaremos Alemania [1]. Este desplazamiento de demanda generará un descenso en el nivel de producción y empleo en España, y un aumento de la producción y el empleo en Alemania.  Asimismo, recordando que la balanza por cuenta corriente es igual a la producción doméstica menos el gasto domestico, lo más probable es que se genere un déficit en la balanza de pagos por cuenta corriente de España y un superávit en la de Alemania. Se produce, por tanto, un problema de ajuste tras un choque económico, en este caso de demanda.
 

         Una posibilidad de ajuste, no disponible en la unión monetaria, sería  devaluar el tipo de cambio peseta/marco.  Ello produciría una mejora de la competitividad española, aumentando la demanda, la producción y el empleo en España, y a la inversa para Alemania. Esta posibilidad de devaluar no existiría, obviamente, en la unión monetaria. Se plantea, por tanto, el problema de si existe una alternativa a la variación del tipo de cambio para lograr el ajuste en la unión monetaria. Naturalmente, puede ponerse en duda la eficacia de la devaluación para lograr el ajuste. En la medida en que sea cierto que la devaluación no es eficaz, descender  el coste de la unión monetaria.

 

              Una primera posibilidad de ajuste en la unión monetaria se basa en la flexibilidad de salarios y precios. Si el desempleo hace descender los salarios en España, y el exceso de demanda de empleo los aumenta en Alemania, mejorará  la  competitividad de los productos españoles, que verán descender su precio, y empeora  la de los productos alemanes, que verán aumentar su precio, alcanzándose un nuevo equilibrio.
 

Wage and price flexibility Regions within a currency area facing an asymmetric shock might restore competitivity by reducing nominal incomes and prices, so obtaining equivalent effects to the devaluation of a local currency. The main perceived obstacle to this flexible price solution is "price level inertia", and in particular the "stickiness" of nominal wages. By comparison with both the US and Japan, for example, EU short-run wage flexibility in response to changing employment conditions is low. The Commission (1990) has calculated that, in the event of a 1% price rise, it would take a similar rise in EU unemployment to prevent a rise in wages, but only a tenth of that in the US and Japan. Even where regional prices and wages have a degree of flexibility, they "as a rule, adjust more slowly than exchange rates" (Ochel 1997), leading to the conclusion that the ability to devalue is the more effective mechanism. The superior effectiveness of exchange-rate flexibility, however, is itself open to question. The stabilising properties of a floating rate may be minimal " for small economies in which imports are so important a component of the cost of living that a reduction in real wages through nominal depreciation is impossible." (Obstfeld 1985) It also "presupposes that workers are subject to the illusion that price increases resulting from devaluation should not trigger demands for higher wages" (Ochel 1997). Peters (1995) similarly observes that: "the assumption of money illusion on the part of rational economic agents appears unrealistic, especially if devaluations are frequent. It would mean that wage-earners would accept a real wage reduction following devaluation, but refuse a nominal wage reduction with similar effects". It is nevertheless arguable that exchange-rate changes do provide an effective short-term means of adjustment, at least for as long as the "money illusion" lasts. The post-war record of sterling is indeed one of repeated reductions in real incomes through devaluation - though whether this has served to restore long-term competitivity to the UK economy is very much open to doubt. Existing research (Vaubel 1976 and 1978; Eichengreen 1991; De Grauwe and Vanhavebeke 1993; von Hagen and Neumann 1994) indicates that real wage and price levels tend to fluctuate less between regions within a currency area than between currency areas, for which a number of explanations can be advanced. The simplest is that the existing division into currency areas has "got it right": adjustments in price and wage levels are unnecessary because the regions experience no asymmetric shocks. In the case of Europe, this conflicts with the evidence (see "Country specific and sector specific shocks" above). Alternatively, the low responsiveness of prices and wages could reflect high labour mobility. In the case of Europe, this is also contradicted by the evidence (see "Mobility of Labour" below). The explanation advanced by Obstfeld and Peri (1998) is rather that "large swings in relative regional prices could be politically problematic for integration at the national level"; and they argue that the same consideration is likely to apply within EMU, despite the hopes of the Commission(1990) that "competition and wage discipline will enhance wage and price flexibility". They add: "the low extent of interregional price movement tells us little about the ease with which resources are reallocated in currency unions, or about the need for reallocation". It can also be argued, however, that adjustments in real prices and wages through one mechanism or another are inevitable in the long term. Just as the terms "balance of payments deficit/surplus" disguise the fact that a country's balance of payments must by definition balance, so must payments between regions, localities - or, for that matter between families and individuals - balance. Imbalances can for a time be funded by gifts and loans; but sooner or later "solvency constraints rule out using permanently higher fiscal or external deficits to maintain public or private spending (Corden, 1972; Krugman, 1993)". (Obstfeld and Peri 1998) Moreover, if the necessary reduction in living standards is postponed for too long, the eventual adjustment is likely to be violent: currencies will collapse, firms and individuals will become insolvent and unemployment levels will soar. http://www.europarl.eu.int/workingpapers/econ/104/chap2_en.htm

 

          Una segunda posibilidad de ajuste en la unión se basa en la movilidad del trabajo.  Si la mano de obra desempleada de España se traslada a Alemania, en donde existe un exceso de demanda de trabajo, se alcanza  una nueva situación de pleno empleo en España y se solucionar  el  problema de exceso de demanda de trabajo en Alemania.

 

Mobility of Labour One alternative available to workers unable or unwilling to "price themselves into jobs" is moving to where the jobs are. OCA theory, following Mundell, has given especial weight to mobility of labour; and much has been made by critics of EMU of the apparent reluctance of Europeans to move compared to Americans. Various studies have indeed shown that interregional migration is a significant factor in the United States, contributing more to internal adjustment there than changes in either relative wages or labour-force participation rates (Blanchard and Katz, 1992). By contrast, OECD figures for 1987 showed that French and German workers were only a third as likely to move between départements and Länder as US citizens between States - let alone between France and Germany themselves Similarly, Eichengreen (1993) found that the elasticity of interregional migratory flows with respect to internal wages and employment differentials is smaller in Great Britain and Italy than in the US. Calculations by Pelagidis (1996), based on Eurostat figures, show that since 1992 net migration within the EU has actually been falling, and that migration within the EU as a percentage of total population was in 1995 less than 1% on average. By comparison, some 3% of the US population change their state of residence each year. http://www.europarl.eu.int/workingpapers/econ/104/chap2_en.htm#d

 
-Los choques asimétricos en la unión monetaria europea.
 

        ¿Puede esperarse que sean asimétricos los choques en una unión monetaria?  Los choques  a los que se ve sometida una economía pueden ser asimétricos por dos motivos.

El primero, obviamente, es que el choque sea específico para el país en cuestión, como sería el caso en que se produjeran variaciones no anticipadas en su política económica, en su dotación de recursos, o en el comportamiento de sus agentes económicos.

El segundo, es que la economía se vea sometida a un choque común de naturaleza simétrica, como un choque externo o un choque en un sector productivo específico, pero que se convierta en asimétrico debido a diferencias en las economías de los diferentes  países.

En la literatura económica han recibido especial atención un factor que puede convertir en asimétricos choques en principio simétricos:  La integración en el mercado de productos.

 
-La integración en el mercado de productos: La Comisión y  Krugman.

Si la integración en los mercados de una unión monetaria se produce de forma que sus miembros se especializan en diferentes productos (inter-industria), la posibilidad de que los choques afecten sólo a unos miembros será muy alta. Por el contrario, cuando la integración en los mercados  produce especialización intra-industria, es decir, los componentes para un producto final proceden de diferentes miembros de la unión, será menor la posibilidad de que los choques afecten sólo a uno, o a unos pocos miembros de la unión monetaria.

         Sobre esta fuente de generación de choques asimétricos, la Comisión (1990) ha señalado que, especialmente en el sector de manufacturas, la CEE se caracteriza de forma creciente por el comercio intra-industria basado en la explotación de economías de escala, en lugar de por el comercio inter-industria basado en la ventaja comparativa. Además, como la integración intra-industria se ve alentada por las economías de escala y la diferenciación de productos, puede esperarse que la eliminación de las barreras que obstruyen la explotación de estas ventajas aumentará la integración intra-industria. Por ello, con la realización del mercado único europeo, puede esperarse una intensificación del proceso de crecimiento del comercio intra-industria, siendo menos probable que los choques externos tengan un efecto asimétrico en las economías de la UE.

         Esta opinión de que la integración económica produce una estructura industrial más uniforme, ha sido criticada por diversos autores. Estas críticas se basan en la existencia de efectos de aglomeración. Estos efectos harían que con  la total eliminación de barreras al comercio se produjera una mayor especialización regional, tendiendo a concentrarse en una pequeña región las industrias que utilizan intensivamente un cierto tipo de trabajo especializado. En este caso, la mayor integración económica aumentaría la probabilidad de que se produjeran choques asimétricos. No obstante, debe señalarse que, aunque hay evidencia de que este punto de vista puede ser cierto en el caso de USA - por ejemplo, la concentración de la industria del automóvil en Detroit -, no parece que en la UE se haya producido hasta ahora un proceso de concentración industrial de este tipo, lo cual no quiere decir que en el futuro no puede producirse.

 

Birds of a feather May 27th 1999 From The Economist print edition If EMU encourages greater specialisation in particular industries, economic management will be more difficult THE economic case for the euro rests largely on the idea that it will hasten economic integration. This in turn will promote competition, leading to higher productivity and incomes. The case against rests largely on the idea that “asymmetric shocks”—disturbances that affect some countries much more than others—will be harder to deal with in the absence of national monetary policies. But what if it turns out that the more successful the euro is in promoting integration, the more susceptible the single-currency area becomes to asymmetric shocks? At first sight, this seems unlikely. In a more integrated Europe, surely, countries will be more alike. Maybe not. There are reasons for thinking that integration across a region makes subregions more specialised—that is, less alike. If this turns out to be true for Europe, the gains from integration in good times may be great, but the risks in bad times will be bigger too. Economic theory suggests several connections between integration and regional specialisation. In standard “neoclassical” growth theory, integration makes countries more similar: once capital and labour are free to move, the mix in which the two are used tends to converge internationally. Traditional trade theory complements this finding. It argues that a country’s incomes and industrial structure reflect its endowment of labour, capital and other resources. As countries become richer, the accumulation of physical and human capital comes to outweigh resources such as land and climate: endowments become more similar, and so do patterns of output. More modern theories emphasise different links. “New” growth theory is interested in externalities. The return to a unit of extra investment may be higher in a country that already has a lot of capital: the existing stock confers an external benefit on the new addition. If this effect is powerful, integration may promote divergence rather than convergence: investment will move all the faster to areas that already have lots of capital. “New” trade theory complements this finding (just as traditional trade theory sat happily alongside traditional growth theory). Externalities in production will cause high-technology, high-wage industries to form clusters. The more integrated these areas are through trade, one with another, the greater the tendency for clustering to take place. Again, integration makes economies less alike. At your service The evidence on all this is fiercely contested. There is no consensus on whether the new theories of trade and growth are closer to being true than are the current versions of their predecessors. So far as specialisation is concerned, it is not even clear exactly what the term means, let alone how it should be measured. A lot depends on the level of magnification—that is, on whether you compare broad sectors (manufacturing, farming) or sub-sectors, or even particular industries. It would be hard to deny, though, that the economy of the United States is more regionally specialised than the euro zone. Big industries do seem to have clustered in certain areas: classically, car making in Detroit, software in Silicon Valley, movies in Hollywood. Europe has clusters here and there, but they are less pronounced. In America, asymmetric shocks have often pushed regional economic cycles out of synch, but fiscal transfers and labour mobility have eased the adjustment. Europe may find that integration causes sharper regional cycles—but since its central budget is small and its labour mobility low, its ability to cope may be poorer. A recent study by the OECD reports some further evidence. First, it looks at a measure of output divergence (which asks, in effect, what proportion of each country’s output would need to switch sectors for the country’s pattern of GDP to conform to the euro-area average). The results suggest that specialisation has increased since 1980 in most of the countries examined. (It also suggests that Italy is the most “European” economy, and Belgium the least.) But the findings are inconclusive. Using a similar measure, but looking at 60 sub-national regions within the euro area rather than at countries, and using employment in place of output, the researchers find the opposite: specialisation has been falling, albeit gently, since the mid-1980s. It is possible, indeed likely, that “new” and “neoclassical” effects are going on at the same time. A paper cited by the OECD shows that specialisation in America has traced a bell-curve over time. Regional specialisation increased during the 19th and early 20th centuries as manufacturing, prone, in the “new” view, to form clusters, gained ground over agriculture. Later, this trend reversed and specialisation fell—notwithstanding the fact that America is today more specialised than Europe. What happened? “Neoclassical” factors—trade and comparative advantage—caused a long-term shift in industrial structure: the economy moved from manufacturing to services. Many services have to be produced where they are consumed, which means less regional specialisation. This was enough to outweigh any tendency within manufacturing for specialisation to increase. (Note, however, that specialisation even within American manufacturing has declined in the second half of this century: the tendency to cluster may be weaker than before.) Europe can draw comfort from this. Its shift from manufacturing to services lags far behind America’s. Integration, other things equal, will speed it up. This should mitigate any tendency towards clustering. For now at least, service economies look more alike than manufacturing economies, and should prove less susceptible to shocking developments. Paul Krugman first drew attention to this question in his book “Geography and Trade” (1991). The OECD study is “EMU: Facts, Challenges and Policies” (1999). The study on America is “Economic Integration and Convergence: US Regions, 1840-1987” by Sukkoo Kim, NBER Working Paper 6335 (www.nber.org). Copyright © 2002 The Economist Newspaper and The Economist Group. All rights reserved. http://www.economist.com/PrinterFriendly.cfm?Story_ID=322189

Teoria de la integracion monetaria. Economía Internacional". Joaquín Pi. Última actualización agosto de 2005.